Labor Relations - Disputes and Concerted Activites - Right of Employees of a Public Corporation to Strike by Harris, Roger
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 8 
1961 
Labor Relations - Disputes and Concerted Activites - Right of 
Employees of a Public Corporation to Strike 
Roger Harris 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roger Harris, Labor Relations - Disputes and Concerted Activites - Right of Employees of a Public 
Corporation to Strike, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1260 (1961). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss8/8 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1260 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
LABOR RELATIONS - DISPUTES AND CoNCERTED ACTIVITIES - RIGHT OF 
EMPLOYEES OF A PUBLIC CORPORATION To STRIKE - The Los Angeles Metro-
politan Transit Authority Act provides that "employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection."1 The Transit Authority brought this 
action to obtain a declaratory judgment that its employees did not have 
the right to strike. The trial court upheld its contention. On appeal, 
held, reversed, two justices dissenting. This statutory language has been 
uniformly construed to include the right to strike.2 Since this statute 
dealt only with public employees, the legislature must have intended to 
grant this right or it would not have unqualifiedly used this language. 
Moreover, according the employees this right was not an unconstitutional 
delegation of the state's authority. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905 
(1960). 
There is considerable diversity among the states with respect to the rights 
of public employees to organize, bargain collectively, and strike. In at 
least three states, they are prohibited by statute from joining unions.a In 
five other states, either by statute! or court decision,5 a governmental unit 
may not enter into collective bargaining agreements with its employees. 
In thirteen states, although government employees may organize, they are 
by statute6 or court decision7 denied the right to strike. The prohibitions 
1 CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. act 4481 (Deering Supp. 1959). 
2 The quoted language has been included in the following statutes: Norris-LaGuardia 
Act§ 2, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1932); National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 
452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). It has been construed to include the right to 
strike in the following cases: Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 
(1951); International Union UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). 
3Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (2) (1958); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 54-909 
(1961) (police); North Carolina, N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 95-97 to -310 (Supp. 1959). Compare 
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178D (Supp. 1960) (police excluded from law which gives 
other public employees right to join unions without employer discrimination). 
4 Texas, TEX. REv. Cxv STAT. art. 5154c (1948). 
5 Miami Waterworks Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); 
Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946); 
Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. App. 1957); City of 
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W .2d 539 (1947). 
6 Florida, FLA. STAT, ANN. § 839.221 (Supp. 1960); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws 
§ 423.202 (1948); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51-58 (Supp. 1960); New York, N.Y. 
CIV. SER.v. LAw § 108; Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1954); Pennsylvania, 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1-5 (1952); Texas, TEX. REv. CIV STAT. art. 5154c-4 (1948). 
7 City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); 
City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 141 A.2d 624 (R.I. 1958); Local 976, 
!BEW v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956); City of Los Angeles 
v. Los Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); 
Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 
(1958). 
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against government employee organizations are generally applicable only 
to policemen and firemen. These limitations are justified on the ground 
that since these employees are responsible for the protection of persons and 
property and the preservation of public order the government must com-
mand their undivided loyalty. Therefore, employee organizations which 
might lead to dissension and possible diminution of governmental control 
must be proscribed.a However, failure to afford a reasonable outlet for 
grievances through an organization which can provide for orderly com-
munication and participation in the settlement of these grievances seems 
more dangerous to maintenance of essential public services than any possible 
conflict of loyalty. At a minimum, public interest in effective police and 
fire departments does not justify a blanket bar to government employee 
organizations. And even where organization is allowed, it has often been 
suggested that government participation in collective bargaining agree-
ments would be a derogation of governmental sovereignty.9 Proponents of 
this view argue that issues such as wages, hours, tenure, and working condi-
tions are to be determined through the exercise of the legislative power 
which the legislature cannot delegate or bargain away. However, if a 
government may negotiate agreements with its employees individually 
without impairing its sovereignty, collective bargaining agreements should 
have no greater deleterious effects. The legislature may prescribe the broad 
framework within which negotiation may be conducted without thereby 
derogating from its authority. In many jurisdictions where the govern-
ment may enter collective bargaining agreements, the right to strike is 
denied public employees because it is thought such a strike would be a 
denial of authority and a rebellion against the government.to But if the 
government through its legislative or judicial branch consents to the 
exercise of the right to strike, it is hard to regard such a strike as a rebel-
s See, e.g., King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W .2d 547 (1947); City of Jackson v. Mc-
Leod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So. 2d 319 (1946); Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 
(1935); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 At!. 234 (1923). 
9 See cases cited supra note 5, which deny to government the right to enter collective 
bargaining agreements. 
10 See Nonvalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); 
City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, supra note 7; City of Cleveland v. 
Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio C.P. 1949); 
Local 976, IBEW v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 7; City of Pawtucket v. 
Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, supra note 7. The following is one statement of this view: 
"To tolerate or recognize any combinaton of Civil Service employees of the Government 
as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, 
but inconsistent with every principle on which our government is founded. Nothing is 
more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the state can 
dictate to the Government the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will 
carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen. To admit 
as true that Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Gov-
ernment, unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive 
and judicial power. Nothing would be more ridiculous." Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 
180 Misc. 868, 875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
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lion.11 Another consideration in this area is the considerable public in-
convenience and danger to public health and safety which may be caused 
by a strike of government workers.1 2 However, since this public interest 
is not necessarily associated with all such strikes, the right need not cate-
gorically be denied to all government workers. A more desirable approach 
would be in each case to balance the interests of the union in being allowed 
to exercise its most powerful economic weapon to support its collective 
bargaining positions against the convenience, health, safety and welfare of 
the general public. For example, under this approach a strike of municipal 
golf course caddies would not sufficiently jeopardize the general welfare to 
justify proscription of the right. However, it should be noted that the 
broad, unqualified language of the statute in the principal case does not 
lend itself to use of the balancing approach in the absence of qualifications 
created by judicial :fiat. Even where a jurisdiction does adopt the suggested 
balancing test, alternative devices should be available to facilitate settle-
ment of disputes in those cases in which proscription of the right to strike 
would be proper. In many states, statutes have been enacted to ensure 
uninterrupted service from public utilities; such statutes generally provide 
for conciliation, mediation, and often, as a last resort, compulsory arbitra-
tion.ls In general, a policy of granting the right to strike or providing 
11 The majority in the principal case had no trouble finding legislative authority to 
confer the right to strike, but declined to comment on the constitutional problems if the 
employees were policemen, firemen, or officers exercising a portion of the state's sover-
eignty. Principal case at 6, 355 P .2d at 910. Another court, while unable to find sufficient 
precedent in the common law, expressly conceded the power of the legislature to grant 
the right to strike. See City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, supra note 7. 
Although often unexpressed, many courts seem compelled under a notion of judicial 
restraint to leave to the legislature such a departure which involves a resolution of a 
basic policy conflict. It has been argued that when government is acting in a proprietary, 
as opposed to a governmental capacity, a strike does not contravene its authority since 
there is no opposition to the sovereign power. Local 266, !BEW v. Salt River Project, 78 
Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954). However, most courts have held this distinction inapposite 
in this context since all governmental activities are equally services for the general public 
whether or not they may also be performed by private agencies. See, e.g., New York City 
Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Nutter v. 
City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P .2d 741 (1946). 
12 This problem influenced the courts in the following cases. City of Detroit v. 
Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); 
City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, supra note 7; Port of Seattle v. 
International Longshoremen's Union, supra note 7. 
13 Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 453 (1952); Hawaii, HAwAn REv. LAws § 91 (1955); 
Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401 to -15 (1952); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 
150B, § 1-8 (1957); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws § 423.201-08 (1948); Missouri, Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 295 (1949); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-401, -802 (1960) New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13B-1 to -29 (Supp. 1960); North Dakota, N.D. CENTURY CODE §§ 34-11-01 
to -05 (1961); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 43, § 213.1-6 (1952); Texas, TEX. REv. Cxv. 
STAT. art. 1446a (Supp. 1960); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-95.-1 to -95.6 (1950); Wis-
consin, WIS. STAT. § 111.50-64 (1957). These statutes, however, create separate problems of 
their own. The constitutionality of a number of them has been challenged on the ground 
that federal legislation has pre-empted the field. See Local 8-6, Oil Workers v. Missouri, 
361 U.S. 363 (1960) (issue moot; contested injunction expired by its own terms); Amalga-
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adequate substitute machinery where the right to strike would be improper 
would tend to remove dissatisfaction of the public servant who has less voice 
in the determination of questions concerning his employment status than 
has his privately-employed counterpart. 
Roger Harris 
mated Ass'n of Street Employees v. WJSconsin Employment Relations Bd., supra note 2 
(Wisconsin statute held unconstitutional); Henderson v. State ex rel. Lee, 65 So. 2d 22 
(Fla. 1958) (Florida statute held unconstitutional). 
